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We must correct errors in the law and we must make those recognized and
accepted changes with the times which are substantiated by reason and experi-
ence. Reason outranks technicality. Public welfare and human rights are far
more important than a tenacious adherence to unsound decisions of the past,
especially when outmoded or where reasons for their existence are nonexistent
today.38
CONCLUSION
Thus, in recent years, significant changes have developed in the negli-
gence and warranty cases which have greatly expanded the range of
manufacturer's liability as had been manifested by earlier authorities. In
fact, the expansion has grown to the point where the courts are at almost
hopeless variance as to the present rule in such cases. What is more alarm-
ing is that this disagreement will continue and expand to new heights as
new occasions arise which make it fitting "to discard legal concepts of the
past to meet new conditions and practices of our changing and progressing
civilization. ' 39
However, iwspite of the diversity of reasoning employed by the courts
in establishing the rights and duties between manufacturers and con-
sumers, it is safe to assert that almost anyone can recover from the manu-
facturer of a defective or deleterious article which has been put out in
the legitimate channels of trade regardless of the "due care" or "privity"
requirements. In the final analysis, any outmoded fictions formerly em-
ployed by manufacturers to seek relief from their responsibility to the
buying public cannot be asserted in view of the recent findings of the
courts which have attempted to keep abreast with our ever-changing ways
of life.
38 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1958).
39 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612, 615 (1958).
WIRE TAPPING-A DEFINITION OF "INTERCEPTION," "DI-
VULGENCE," "USE," "CONSENT OF THE SENDER," AND
"PERSONS PROHIBITED" SINCE THE NARDONE CASE
Congress had enacted what appeared to be a very comprehensive piece
of legislation to prohibit the interception of wire communications and
their divulgence if either is not authorized by the sender and to prohibit
the derivative use of such intercepted communications if that is also not
authorized by the sender. A pertinent part of this enactment reads as
follows:
[No] person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communi-
cation and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person .. .and no per-
son having received such intercepted communication or having become ac-
quainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same,
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or any part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall di-
vulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein
contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
1
The cases are not in agreement as to the extension of the meaning of
"interception" and "consent of the sender" and there are occasions when
the courts have permitted "derivative use" to be made of intercepted
communications as it will be presently observed. Yet certain basic agree-
ment has been had as to what amounts to "divulgence" and "persons
prohibited."
In the first Nardone case, 2 the United States Supreme Court considered
the use of a wire tapping apparatus on a telephone wire to listen in on
an interstate communication between the petitioners to be an interception
of a communication within the meaning of §605. It was held that when
federal agents testified in court to the contents of the conversation there
was present a divulgence forbidden by §605.3 Another important holding
of the case was that the consent of the sender is required for such inter-
ception and divulgence even if the Federal Government sought to engage
in such activities for the detection and prevention of crime. Therefore the
government was held to be one of the persons prohibited from divulging
intercepted messages without consent of the sender.4
The same court in the second Nardone case5 stated that the indirect use
of the intercepted communication was forbidden as inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty to the same extent as
direct use thereof was forbidden, and that knowledge gained from inter-
cepted messages not only cannot be used in court but cannot be used at
all. This broad language would appear to prohibit acquiring further in-
formation of the whereabouts or activities of one or both of the partici-
pants in a wire communication or their associates and to enlarge the
meaning of divulgence to include testifying in court as to the substance,
content, meaning, existence, or purport of indirect evidence acquired with
knowledge gained from an intercepted wire communication.6
1 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1956).
2 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
3 Ibid., at 382. "To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is
to divulge the message. The conclusion that the act forbids such testimony seems to us
unshaken by the government's arguments."
4 Ibid., at 381. "'[N]o person' comprehends federal agents, and the ban on the com-
munication to 'any person' bars testimony to the content of an intercepted message."
5 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
0 Ibid., at 340. "To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized but to put no
curb of their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent
with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.'"
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An important landmark case which broadened the definitions of "inter-
ception" and "divulgence" and extended the application of the require-
ment of "consent of the sender" is Weiss v. United States7 wherein the
court was faced with the problem of a wire tap placed on an intrastate
telephone conversation by federal agents and a recording of the message
made by a stenographer and by a phonograph which message was pre-
sented as recorded to two of the defendants to persuade them to turn
state's evidence and later presented as recorded into evidence at the trial.
Conviction was had of the remaining defendants on the basis of the testi-
mony of Messman and Garrow, who had turned state's evidence, and on
the basis of the stenographic and phonographic recordings. The court
determined that tapping of an intrastate phone call by federal agents was
an interception as there was no wording in §605 to limit the meaning of
"interception" to interstate and foreign communications and as it was
not readily ascertainable whether a given telephone conversation would
cross state borders. "Divulgence" prohibited by §605 was had when the
government permitted Messman and Garrow, who had been parties to
certain conversations, to read the stenographic transcript and also when
the prosecutor entered the stenographic transcript and the phonograph
records into evidence. The court further held that where the other par-
ticipants of intercepted phone conversations were ignorant of the inter-
ception and did not consent thereto, an agreement on the part of some of
the participants to turn state's evidence after they had been apprised of
the government's knowledge of their phone talks was not consent to the
interception and divulgence on the part of the ignorant participants. Like-
wise consent of Messman and Garrow is not shown as § 605 requires vol-
untary consent of a sender.
The foregoing cases have set down basic propositions which it is the
purpose of this comment to develop firstly, by presenting cases that fol-
low or extend their concepts; secondly, by examining cases that diverge
from them as to permissible uses of intercepted communications; thirdly,
by distinguishing cases that are not true wire communication situations at
all; and fourthly, by exploring the divergent meanings of "interception"
and "consent of the sender."
CASES IN AGREEMENT OR EXTENSION OF ABOVE BASIC CONCEPTS
An important case extending the broad concepts of the foregoing cases
is Benanti v. United States.8 There, the New York state police obtained a
warrant authorizing them to tap telephone wires in accordance with state
law. The police were interested in rounding up narcotics peddlers. The
7 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
8 355 U.S. 96 (1957). Consult 7 De Paul L. Rev. 267 (1958) for a note on this case.
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phone call intercepted contained information that eleven pieces were to
be transported. However the police found instead eleven cans of alcohol
for which federal tax stamps had not been procured. A federal trial fol-
lowed. A New York state police officer testified for the government as
to the events leading to the discovery of the cans and admitted on cross-
examination that wire tapping had given a lead to the discovery. The
court said there was an interception forbidden by §605 even if it was
committed by state officers and by a tap on intrastate calls and authorized
by state law whenever evidence obtained therefrom is presented in a
federal trial. The use of the interception to obtain a lead to discover evi-
dence of another crime than the one toward which the interception was
directed was considered a derivative use prohibited by §605. And although
the words of the conversation were not disclosed to the jury, there was
held to be a divulgence prohibited by § 605 upon disclosure to the jury
of the existence of the communication because the jury would be free to
speculate that the existence of a certain intercepted conversation was
further proof of petitioner's criminal activities.
In Lipinski v. United States9 the defendant was convicted of intercept-
ing and conspiring to intercept telephone communications and of divulg-
ing them to third persons under 47 U.S.C.A. § 501. All of the interceptions
were made on intrastate lines but all of the lines could be used in inter-
state calls by dialing "0." The court held § 605 applicable to prohibit in-
terception of intrastate calls even if the intrastate system only is being
used and stated it was immaterial that the telephone system was made of
two independent and constituent parts.
Also in agreement with and in extension of the foregoing concepts is
United States v. Gris'° wherein the defendant was convicted for the same
crime as the defendant in the Lipinski case. The defendant here was a
private detective hired by one Fain to obtain evidence against Fain's wife
for use in a possible divorce action to be brought by Fain against his wife.
The defendant rented an apartment adjoining Mrs. Fain's room, drilled a
hole in the wall, and installed a wire tap which would ring a buzzer and
cause a neon light to glow whenever Mrs. Fain received a phone call. The
conversations were recorded. In sustaining the defendant's conviction, the
court considered a private detective to be one of the persons prohibited
from intercepting and divulging the contents, substance, purport, mean-
ing, or existence of wire communications. The court also considered it of
no consequence that an interception was had on an intrastate conversation;
there was an interception nevertheless. The disclosure of the evidence to
Fain was a forbidden divulgence.
9 251 F.2d 53 (C.A. 10th, 1958).
10 247 F.2d 860 (C.A. 2d, 1957).
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Diamond v. United States"' wherein only four or five of some one hun-
dred fifty telephone calls said to have been intercepted by the defendant
were made in interstate communications, the court upheld his conviction
for the interceptions, stating that privacy of a conduit of interstate com-
merce was hoped for although the same physical equipment is used in
intrastate commerce. To the same effect that punishment under 47
U.S.C.A. § 501 is to be had for intercepting and divulging telephone con-
versations without authority of the sender whether the call is in intrastate,
interstate, or foreign commerce is Massengale v. United States.12
DERIVATIVE USES PERMITTED
A keynote case giving rise (in many cases following its doctrine) to
the permission of one type of derivative use of intercepted communica-
tions seemingly prohibited by §605 and the foregoing cases and standing
as a precedent for a seemingly unwarranted contraction of the protection
of the statute is Goldstein v. United States."1 In that case the defendant
was not a party to any of the intercepted telephone messages. The gov-
ernment made the interceptions. The court assumed for purposes of its
decision that the government used certain of the contents of some of the
intercepted communications to persuade two of the defendants who
participated in these conversations to testify for the government and that
these interceptions were not authorized by the sender. The defendant was
held to have no standing in court to object to the introduction of such
evidence. The majority opinion stated:
[Standing has long been denied] to one not the victim of an unconstitutional
search and seizure to object to the introduction in evidence of that which was
seized. A fortiori the same rule should apply to the introduction of evidence
induced by the use or disclosure thereof to a witness other than the victim of
the seizure. 14
However, the dissent of Mr. Justice Murphy concurred in by Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter treated the wire tapping restriction to be different gen-
erally from the search and seizure problem. This opinion states:
In enacting § 605, Congress sought to protect society at large against the evils
of wire tapping and kindred unauthorized intrusions into private intercourse
conducted by means of modern media of communication . . . To that end the
statute prohibits not only the interception and the divulgence of private mes-
11 108 F.2d 859 (C.A. 6th, 1938).
12 240 F.2d 781 (C.A. 6th, 1957).
"3 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
14 Ibid., at 121. The court went on to hold that § 605 does not render inadmissible in
a federal criminal trial testimony of a witness induced in advance of trial to testify by
use of communications intercepted in violation of the act but to which communications
defendants were not parties.
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sages without the consent of the sender but also the use of information so ac-
quired by any person not entitled to it. . . . While the sender can render inter-
ception, divulgence, or use lawful by his consent, it is a complete Non Sequitur
to conclude that he alone has standing to object to the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of §605.15
The majority opinion is, however, currently being accepted as a prece-
dent on the "no standing" issue. United States v. Lewis 6 held that two
of the defendants implicated in the violation of gambling laws had no
standing to object that the telephone lines on which calls were intercepted
were not under their control as these defendants were not parties to the
intercepted conversations. However, the court also held that there was
consent on the part of those defendants who participated in the conver-
sations. Then the presence of consent should mean that there is no vio-
lation of § 605. For this reason alone the objection of the non-participating
defendants ought to be considered as nugatory.
In United States v. Gris1 7 the court held that the defendant could not
object to the government's offering into evidence the conversations inter-
cepted by the defendant where the defendant was not a party to the
conversations. A conviction for the violation of 47 U.S.C.A. § 501 pro-
hibiting unauthorized interception and divulgence of telecommunications
was had. However, here the defendant himself made the interception
which constituted the crime with which he was charged under a section
expressly stating how that crime is committed. In Goldstein the govern-
ment itself made the seizure of the telecommunication which resulted in
the defendant's conviction. Gris would seem to fit the principle that § 605
was intended to forbid unwarranted intrusions into telecommunications
and that § 501 intended to punish these intrusions and not to fit the situa-
tion where an intercepted communication is sought to be used against a
party other than the party making the unauthorized intrusion.
It would appear that the dissent in Goldstein conforms to the broad
protection laid down in § 605, in each Nardone decision, and in Weiss.
The court in Olmstead v. United States's held that wire tapping and kin-
dred interferences with telecommunications does not constitute a search
or a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. The courts in subsequent decisions have agreed that the
problem of interference with wire communications is not a problem of
search and seizure but is instead one of protecting the privacy of com-
munications used in interstate commerce against dangerous uses for which
people might be tempted to apply them and this protection was afforded
15 Ibid., at 125.
1 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C., 1950).
17 146 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y., 1956). 18 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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by § 605 (which Congress had the power to enact under the authority
granted it by the commerce clause of the United States Constitution). 19
If Congress had chosen to make an exclusionary rule of evidence more
rigid in wire tap situations than normally exists in those cases involving
the usual search and seizure, then a person not a party to the intercepted
communication should be free to object to its introduction into evidence
if consent of none of the participants to the communication has been
secured.
CASES PRESENTING NO WIRE COMMUNICATION PROBLEM UNDER § 605
Before examination is made of what constitutes "interception" and
"consent of the sender," the cases that seem to present communications
problems under § 605 but do not do so should be distinguished.
A frequent source of conflicting statements as to the interpretation of
"interception" has been Goldman v. United States.20 In that case, evidence
was obtained by federal agents by the use of a detectaphone applied to
the wall of a room adjoining the office of the defendant. This device had
a receiver so delicate that it could pick up sounds emanating from the
defendant's office whenever he spoke into the phone and an amplifier for
making the conversations audible. There was a divulgence when the
agents dictated the messages to a recording secretary as they were over-
heard and when the testimony was given as to the contents of the mes-
sages in court. The court held that there was no interception explaining
that words spoken into a telephone receiver within the listening range of
another do not constitute a communication by wire within the meaning
of 47 U.S.C.A. § 153.21 An interpretation of "interception" was given as
follows:
As has rightly been held, this word indicates the taking or seizure by the
way or before arrival at the destined place. It does not ordinarily connote the
obtaining of what is to be sent before, or at the moment, it leaves the posses-
sion of the proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the pos-
session of the intended receiver. 22
It is to be noted that the decision involves a method of eavesdropping
whereby one is enabled to seize what is sent at the moment it leaves the
19 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321
(1939); Rose v. United States, 277 F.2d 448 (C.A. 10th, 1955); Diamond v. United States,
108 F.2d 859 (C.A. 6th, 1938).
20 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
2147 U.S.C.A. § 153 (a) (Supp., 1956) reads: "Wire communication . . . means the
transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds by ... aid of wire, cable, or
other like connection between the points of the origin and reception of such transmis-
sion, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services . . . incidental to
such transmission."
22 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942).
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possession of a speaker and what is received at the moment it comes into
the possession of a listener without, at the same time, involving an appa-
ratus that is by some method attached to a wire communication in use
by the participants to a conversation; hence the situation presents a differ-
ent problem from the cases involving an apparatus and applying the
Goldman definition.
A similar type of situation is presented by Rayson v. United States23
wherein it was stated by the court not to be an interception within § 605
for another person to listen to what is said through a telephone receiver
held in the hand of the person to whom a message is addressed since the
conversation is completed when it is heard and not seized before it reaches
the person to whom it is addressed. Again, however, this is a situation
Where an eavesdropper can seize a conversation by wire at the time it is
received into the possession of a listener and at the time it leaves the
possession of a speaker without the use of an apparatus attached to or
connected with a wire system.
Also presenting a fact situation in the nature of eavesdropping is United
States v. Bookie.2 4 There two policemen went into a store operated by
one Hubbard. During the course of their investigation, a telephone call
came for Hubbard. As Hubbard engaged in the conversation one of the
officers placed his ear near the receiver and overheard the message. The
court accepted the Goldman definition of "interception" and added that
there was no interception within the meaning of § 605, as the message
was heard with the receiver's consent at the moment it reached him.
However as there was held to be no technical "interception," it seems to
be superfluous to present the question of the consent of either party to
the conversation, since § 605 reads "no person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept . . ." and the Nardone, Weiss, and Benanti cases
have said that the consent of the sender is required for an interception
and a divulgence of a wire communication.
In Irvine v. California2 5 when the defendant was absent from his home
policemen bored a hole in the roof of the house and strung wires from
a neighboring garage to a microphone placed successively in a hall, a
bedroom, and a closet in the dwelling of the defendant. The court ex-
plained that there was no interception within the meaning of The Federal
Communications Act as there was no interference with any system of
communication. All that was overheard was what an eavesdropper sta-
tioned in the hall, the bedroom, or the closet might have overheard.
2, 238 F.2d 160 (C.A. 9th, 1956).
24 229 F.2d 130 (C.A. 7th, 1956).
• 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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The novel situation presented by On Lee v. United States26 likewise
amounted to eavesdropping and not to an interference with a wire com-
munication. In that case a federal narcotics agent had a small microphone
on the inside of his coat pocket and a small antenna running along his arm
when he entered the defendant's shop. Another federal agent outside the
shop used a radio to pick up the conversation taking place inside the shop.
The use of a radio to magnify sound was considered to be no different
from the use of a telescope to magnify a vision and the evidence was held
admissible.
However, there was held to be an interception where a microphone was
installed on a desk in the defendant's office when telephone wires were
used in connection with the transmission of sounds picked up by the
microphone to a federal agent who simultaneously monitored the trans-
missions in United States v. Coplon.2 7 The court stated, however, that it
could not hold otherwise because of the government's inability to dis-
close how the microphone was installed and in what manner the connec-
tion differed from a wire tapping apparatus.
CONCEPTIONS DEVELOPED TO DEFINE INTERCEPTION AND CONSENT
OF THE SENDER
There seems to be an irreconcilable conflict among the courts as to
what constitutes an interception where extension telephones are used by
third parties and where devices are attached at or near a receiver. However,
there seems to be no conflict where a party initiating a phone call reaches
a party other than the one with whom he wishes to speak. As to what
constitutes consent of the sender, the courts have differed as to whether
one or both of the parties to a phone conversation must authorize an
interception and a divulgence. There has, at times, also been a conflict in
the judicial opinions as to whether the consent must be given not only to
the person making the interception and the initial disclosure but also to
any other person obtaining information from the authorized person if he
desires to make use of that which he has obtained.
This conflict has come to a head in the opinions of three judges who
heard Reitmeister v. Reitmeister.2 8 There Adolph Reitmeister sued to re-
cover damages from Louis Reitmeister, Louis' hired detective Hopp, a
Mrs. Lippman and one Nachby for the unauthorized use of intercepted
communications. Adolph would telephone Louis and Hopp at Louis' office
and use abusive language toward them. On one occasion when Adolph
phoned Hopp, Hopp stated that if someone took recordings of Adolph's
26 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
27 88 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y., 1950).
28 162 F.2d 691 (C.A. 2d, 1947).
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conversations Adolph would regret it. To this warning the plaintiff re-
plied, "The hell, use the record, do what you want, I want the world to
know about it." Louis had an extension telephone in his office and use was
made of this extension whenever Adolph called. Attached to the receiver
of the extension was a recording device which recorded the conversations.
It had appeared that Adolph knew Louis was recording the conversations.
However Adolph did not know that Louis would play the recordings to
Hopp or that Louis had informed Mrs. Lippman and her attorney Nachby
of the nature of Adolph's conversations and had given them the record-
ings thereof for Mrs. Lippman's action against Adolph a year later in the
Surrogates Court. Mrs. Lippman and Nachby subsequently presented the
recordings into evidence in that action. All of the judges in the instant
case agreed that the suit should have been dismissed as to Louis because
Adolph had given his consent to Louis' recording and divulging of the
conversations. This authorization was said to be valid although given in
advance and in general terms. But Judge Chase stated as his chief prop-
osition that there was no interception forbidden by § 605. He observed
that the messages were received into Louis' office without previous diver-
sion and that their initiation by Adolph included their being received by
all receivers in the office. Judge Chase applied the Goldman definition of
interception and explained that Louis heard the messages at the moment
they left Adolph's possession and at the moment they came into the pos-
session of Hopp or Louis' secretary. Judge Learned Hand however held
that there was an interception when the recording device was attached to
the extension receiver and he defined interception to be an interposition
of an independent receiving device between the lips of the speaker and
the ear of the listener. Aside from the recording device, he explained that
there was no difference between the extension lead off of the main circuit
and a wire tap. A conflict also was apparent between Judge Hand and
Judge Clark as to the breadth of the consent given by the plaintiff. Judge
Hand held that Mrs. Lippman and her lawyer ought to be made to prove
that they were in privity with Louis and that if such proof is not made
then there was no consent to their publishing the recordings in the Surro-
gates Court. Judge Clark said that Adolph's consent was in broad enough
terms to cover the use of the recordings in that court. It would seem that
Judge Clark stated the better view because § 605 ("no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept . . . and divulge . . . the existence
... of such intercepted communication") seems to say that divulgence of
a communication the interception of which is unauthorized by the sender
is prohibited. Consistent use of language would require a similar construc-
tion where § 605 reads "and no person having received such intercepted
communication . . . knowing that such information was so obtained,
shall divulge. . . ." The cases have stated that consent of the sender is re-
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
quired for interception, divulgence and other use to be made of a wire
communication. 29
The situation in United States v. Yee Ping long30 involved a conviction
of the defendant on the basis of phonographic records of telephone con-
versations between an informer and the defendant procured by the at-
tachment of a recording device to the telephone wire near the receiver in
the informer's hand. At the direction of a federal agent, the informer tele-
phoned the defendant. The court held that there was no interception of a
communication but merely a recording of a call near one end of the line
and not a seizure between the locality of the call and the locality of the
answer.
In United States v. Lewis31 one telephone conversation was recorded by
a device attached to or placed in proximity to the receiver, and another
was recorded by a stenographer listening on an extension telephone. In
both instances one of the conversing parties either knew a recording was
being made or acquiesced in the recording. The court said that § 605 is
not violated if the conversation is recorded manually, mechanically, or
electrically with the consent of one of the parties to the conversation.
Consent of both conversing parties was not considered a prerequisite to an
interference by a third party. In the same case other phone calls had been
received by police officers who had raided a certain hide-out. The court
held that there was no interception within the meaning of § 605 but mere-
ly a substitution of the police officers for the expected parties as receivers.
The court in Billeci v. United States32 was likewise faced with a situa-
tion where police officers answered the phone whenever it rang. The
officers would tell whomever called that the person to whom the caller
wished to speak was not present but certain of the persons who phoned
chose to leave messages with the officers. The court held that there was no
interception. It was explained that whenever a person making a telephone
call speaks to whomever answers even if he did not wish to speak to the
party answering there was a receipt of a message at the moment it leaves
the possession of the speaker within the Goldman definition. This holding
and the holding in the similar situation in the Lewis case appear to be
sound because only something in the nature of a deception was practiced
in each case and there was no interposition of an intercepting device.
The court in United States v. Guller3 3 held that there was no intercep-
tion where a narcotics agent listened to a phone conversation on an exten-
29 Benanti v. United States, 335 U.S. 96 (1957); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S.
114 (1942); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Gris,
247 F.2d 860 (C.A. 2d, 1957); Diamond v. United States, 108 F.2d 859 (C.A. 6th, 1938).
30 26 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa., 1939). 32 184 F.2d 394 (App. D.C., 1950).
31 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C., 1950). 33 101 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa., 1951).
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sion telephone because there was no interposition of an independent re-
ceiving device between the mouth of the speaker and the ears of the
listener despite the fact that the extension phone had not been connected
to the main circuit before and was connected for purposes of overhearing
the conversations.
United States v. Pierce,3 4 United States v. Sullivan,35 Flanders v. United
States,' United States v. White,3 7 Rathbun v. United States,38 and Douglas
v. United States39 are cases where law enforcement officials listened to
telephone conversations on extension telephones with the knowledge or
consent of one of the two conversing parties. In all of these cases it was
held that there was no interception within the meaning of § 605 where the
consent of one of the parties to the conversation was had. In the Pierce
case the consent was given by a party who had been arrested by the
police. In both Sullivan and Douglas it was given by an informer. A po-
liceman gave the consent in White while in the Rathbun case it was given
by a party who had been intimidated by the defendant. The court in the
Sullivan case also indicated that there was no interception because there
was an-obtaining of what was sent at the moment it left the possession of
the speaker.
However, there is another group of cases opposed to the explanation of
interception and consent of the sender contained in the foregoing cases
and much more in agreement with Judge Learned Hand's consideration of
interception in the Reitmeister case.
A guiding authority for this group of decisions is United States v. Pola-
koff40 wherein an informer, at the urging of F.B.I. agents, telephoned the
defendant and a recording machine was attached to an extension telephone
on the same circuit as the main line and the message was recorded. The
court held that there was an interception by the recording of the conver-
sation heard on the extension telephone and indicated that the statute does
not speak of circuits or taps but does prevent any interference with a
communications system whether the interference is accomplished on the
same circuit or on another circuit. The language of the majority opinion
indicated alternately that both the use of the recording device and the
use of the extension receiver constituted an interference with the com-
munication. As to the consent of the sender, the court said that it means
that both conversing parties must consent to the interception and divul-
gence and the fact that the informer had initiated the call does not mean
that he alone is the sender. It was said that contrary to communications by
34 124 F. Supp . 264 (N.D. Ohio, 1954).
35 116 F. Supp. 480 (D.D.C., 1953). 38 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
36222 F.2d 163 (C.A. 6th, 1955). 3 250 F.2d 576 (C.A. 4th, 1957).
37 228 F.2d 832 (C.A. 7th, 1956). 40 112 F.2d 888 (C.A. 2d, 1940).
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telegram each party to a telephone conversation is alternately a sender
and a receiver.
There was held to be an interception where a third party overhead a
telephone conversation by means of an office "conference system" appar-
ently involving the same circuit even though one of the conversing parties
knew of the arrangement in United States v. Gruber.41 However, the
particular interception and divulgence there under consideration was ex-
pressly prohibited by another statute.42
Where the defendant wanted to play a recording of conversations by
telephone between a government witness and two defense witnesses for
purposes of impeachment, the court held that this could not be done in
James v. United States.43 The court indicated that both conversing parties
must consent to the interception and the use of the contents as evidence.
A clarification of the Goldman doctrine of interception was attempted
in United States v. Stephenson.44 The court acknowledged that an inter-
ception does not include taking what is sent before, or at the moment, it
leaves the possession of the speaker or after, or at the moment, it comes
into the possession of the receiver. But it was said that a moment means
the same instant and even if an infinitesimal interval of time elapses be-
tween the sending and the receiving there is seizure (by the way a mech-
anical device was attached to the bell box of the instrument used by the
initiator of the call). The court said that each party to a phone conversa-
tion is alternately sender and receiver and hence both parties must give
consent to an interception and divulgence.
The Goldman doctrine was further refined in United States v. Hill4 ,
wherein the court held that placing a microphone against a receiver con-
stituted an interception. The court noted that in Goldman, the instru-
ment employed overheard the talk of both conversing parties without at
the same time coming in touch with any part of a communications system.
The court also followed the Polakoff doctrine that both conversing parties
must consent to an interception and divulgence.
It would appear that the cases could be resolved if the Goldman doc-
trine with refinements given it by the James and Hill cases were adhered
to strictly as to the meaning of "interception," and if the sender's consent
were only considered if an interception has been found to exist. The
listening to a phone conversation by a third party by use of an extension
receiver regardless of whether it is or is not on the same circuit and
41 123 F.2d 307 (C.A .2d, 1941).
42 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1948) which prohibits conspiring to defraud the Securities and
Exchange Commission of the disinterested services of telephone operators.
43 191 F.2d 472 (App. D.C., 1951).
44 121 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C., 1954). 47 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y., 1957).
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regardless of whether or not it had only recently been installed should not
be held to be an interception within the meaning of § 605 since a message
is obtained at the moment-the same instant-it leaves the possession of the
speaker and after or at the moment-the same instant-it comes into the
possession of the other conversing party. For the same reason there should
be considered to be no interception where an informer or an investigating
agent picks up a receiver in response to the ring of a telephone and the
speaker converses with him.
CONCLUSION
Apparently the Reitmeister, Yee Ping Jong, Lewis, Stephenson, Pola-
koff, and Hill cases should involve interceptions where there is an inter-
position of an independent device for recording or listening if it is not a
part of the communications system and if the interposition of this device
is had at any point along the communications system by being attached to
or in any contact with any part of the system between the mouth of the
speaker and the ear of the listener. There should then be also an intercep-
tion even if the contact is obtained by any manner at a bell box or a
receiver if a seizure is made after a call leaves the possession of a speaker
or before it comes into the possession of a listener.
The Pierce, Sullivan, Flanders, White, Rathbun, and Douglas cases in-
volved the use of extension phones and hence did not present interceptions
within the Goldman definition. If this is so, then the presence of consent
on the part of either conversing party was not needed since no intercep-
tion was present. These decisions are laying down what could be a dan-
gerous proposition if it were to be applied to a true case of interception as
it was in the Lewis case. All that law enforcement officials would have to
do to obtain consent of one of the conversing parties would be to have it
given to them by an informer or by applying coercion to persons under
arrest or otherwise not in a position to refuse consent to an interception.
In addition it would appear that the Pierce case violates the clear statement
in Weiss that the consent of the sender must be voluntary because a party
arrested by the police is under no less constraint than a party who is urged
to turn state's evidence when confronted with the contents of his con-
versations. The protection afforded by § 605 against unauthorized inter-
ference with wire communications could be assured by requiring consent
to an interference by both parties. The Polakoff case has offered a logical
explanation as to why § 605 was intended to protect both parties to a
communication by wire from interceptions and divulgences and to require
the consent of both parties to authorize such activities. Each party to a
telephone conversation sends his own message either in initiating the con-
versation or in responding to the other party's message and hence each is
a sender of his own message.
